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ABSTRACT 
This article discusses the potential role of incentive systems in combating bribery. In partic-
ular, it uses an agency theory approach to show how a combination of bonus and malus 
payments could help to eliminate bribery in multinational corporations. Expert interviews 
with 35 anti-bribery specialists from Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland 
were conducted and analyzed through qualitative content analysis. It was found that em-
ployees should be rewarded for both productivity and compliance. In addition, performance 
should be measured in a matrix and whistleblowers should receive a bonus for reporting 
undesired behavior. Conversely, significant risks associated with incentives for whistleblow-
ing were also identified. Whilst the empirical findings focus on Europe, their implications 
could be applied globally. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Twenty years ago, bribery was still commonly accepted in many areas of the world. How-
ever, corruption leads to inefficient use of resources, unfair redistribution of income, and 
secessionist responses.1 Frustration, unstable sociopolitical situations, and a lack of con-
tentment among private citizens are just a few of the potential outcomes.2 In addition, 
bribery requires secrecy, which makes the enforcement of agreements very difficult.3 
Given its many negative impacts on a country’s development, multiple nations have out-
lawed bribery.4 
 
However, bribery has not yet been eliminated, with multiple attempts to combat this 
phenomenon ultimately failing. This article will present an agency theory-based approach 
towards eliminating bribery. In particular, it will analyze and discuss whether incentive 
systems could be adjusted to more effectively fight bribery in multinational corporations, 
thereby helping to decrease corruption in developing countries. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
For this study’s purpose, the bribery definitions of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
and Transparency International are amalgamated to define bribery as an act in which a 
party:  
intentionally abuses entrusted power for private gain by offering, promising, or giving 
any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, 			
1  Mark Levin & Georgy Satarov, Corruption and institutions in Russia, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY, 16(1), 113, 114f. (2000); Antonio Argandoña, The United Nations convention against corruption and 
its impact on international companies, JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS, 74(4), 481, 482 (2007); Michael W. 
Collier, Explaining corruption: An institutional choice approach, CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, 38(1), 1, 
6(2002). 
2  Christopher J. Anderson & Yuliya V. Tverdova., Corruption, political allegiances, and attitudes toward govern-
ment in contemporary democracies, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 47(1), 91 , 104 (2003); Pak 
Hung Mo, Corruption and economic growth, JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS, 29(1), 66, 67 (2001); 
Jong Bum Kim, Korean implementation of the OECD bribery convention: Implications for global efforts to fight 
corruption, UCLA PACIFIC BASIN LAW JOURNAL, 17(2/3), 245, 249 (1999). 
3  Paolo Mauro, Why worry about corruption?, ECONOMIC ISSUES 6. WASHINGTON, D.C.: INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND, 6 (1997); Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and development: A review of issues. JOURNAL 
OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE, 35(3), 1320, 1320 (1997); Paolo Mauro, The effects of corruption on growth, 
investment, and government expenditure, IMF WORKING PAPER, WP/96/98 WASHINGTON, D.C.: INTERNA-
TIONAL MONETARY FUND, 86 (1996); John Bray, The use of intermediaries and other alternatives to bribery, 
in: The new institutional economics of corruption, 120(Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Markus Taube & Matthias 
Schramm eds., 2005). 
4  Hongyi Li, Lixin Colin Xu & Heng-fu Zou, Corruption, income distribution, and growth, ECONOMICS & 
POLITICS, 12(2), 155, 156 (2000); Aart Kraay, Pablo Zoido-Lobaton & Daniel Kaufmann, Aggregating govern-
ance indicators, POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 2195 WASHINGTON, D.C.: WORLD BANK, 3 (1999). 	
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to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order that the 
official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in 
order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of in-
ternational business.5 
This definition is ideal for this study since countries throughout the world have based 
their national legislation on the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Moreover, Transpar-
ency International’s definition is the approach employed in the best-known corruption 
index.  
 
This study employs an agency theory approach. In particular, it will emphasize that “prin-
cipals” and “agents” have differing interests6, and that the former commonly desire to be 
compensated for acting in accordance with the latter’s best interests.7 Ultimately, princi-
pals bear responsibility for the outcome of a task delegated to their agents.8 This is partic-
ularly problematic if agents are unsupervised9, in which circumstance they might shirk or 
use the corporation’s resources for their own benefit.10 This constitutes a significant chal-
lenge as regards bribery, which is commonly conducted secretly, such that shareholders 
and CEOs (principals) may not always be aware of actions taken by the company’s sales 
managers (agents). In this context, incentives could potentially prevent employees from 
simply reducing their risk and forcing the owners to bear a bigger share of it.11 Of course, 
internal audits and control mechanisms could be used simultaneously to address agency 
problems.12 
 
 
However, the use of incentives to fight bribery has not yet been investigated in depth. 			
5  See FAQs on corruption, December 20, 2015, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.transpar-
ency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_corruption (last visited 10 Oct. 2018), 1 (2015); OECD, Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and related documents, 
6(4), OECD WORKING PAPERS, https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf 
(last visited 10 Oct. 2018), 7 (2011). 
6  Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency theory: An assessment and review, ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW, 
14(1), 57, 59 (1989). 
7  Patrick McColgan, Agency theory and corporate governance: A review of the literature from a UK perspective, 
6 (2001). 
8  Stephen A. Ross, The economic theory of agency: The principal’s problem, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC RE-
VIEW, 63(2), 134, 134 (1973) 
9  Peter Wright, Ananda Mukherji & Mark J.Kroll, A reexamination of agency theory assumptions: Extensions 
and extrapolations, THE JOURNAL OF SOCIO-ECONOMICS,30(5), 413, 426 (2001). 
10  Luis R. Gomez-Mejia & David B. Balkin, Determinants of faculty pay: An agency theory perspective, ACADEMY 
OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 35(5), 921, 923 (1992). 
11  Henry L. Tosi, Jr. & Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, The decoupling of CEO pay and performance: An agency theory 
perspective, ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 34(2), 169, 169 (1989). 
12  Michael B. Adams, Agency theory and the internal audit, MANAGERIAL AUDITING JOURNAL, 9(8), 8, 12 
(1994). 	
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The overwhelming majority of literature on wages and bribery has focused on the public 
sector and on adequate wages in general, rather than on incentives.13 For instance, it has 
been analyzed whether tax collectors openness to bribery may be increased by using in-
centive systems.14 It has also been discussed whether graders in Burkina Faso are more or 
less likely to accept bribes under bonus or malus systems.15 In contrast to previous studies, 
this article will analyze whether incentive systems could help to eliminate bribery in mul-
tinational corporations. 
III. METHODY 
 
Due to the significant research gap identified above, it was not possible to form hypothe-
ses that could be quantitatively tested. Therefore, an explorative approach was chosen.16 
Thirty-five formal interviews were conducted with anti-bribery experts from Austria, 
Germany, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland, aiming to answer the following research ques-
tions: 
 
How could incentive systems help to prevent corruption in multinational corpora-
tions? 
 
Which risks are associated with anti-bribery incentives? 
 
The interviewees were recruited through the author’s personal network, and the inter-
views were transcribed and analyzed using qualitative content analysis.17 The recruited in-
terviewees have various backgrounds. First, 15 white-collar criminals were interviewed in 
			
13  Rajeev K. Goel & Daniel P. Rich, On the economic incentives for taking bribes, PUBLIC CHOICE, 61(3),269, 
269f. (1989); Rafael Di Tella & Ernesto Schargrodsky, (2003). The role of wages and auditing during a crack-
down on corruption in the city of Buenos Aires, JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 46(1), 269, 269f. (2003); 
Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers, THE JOUR-
NAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 3(1), 1, 6 (1974); Caroline Van Rijckeghem & Beatrice Weder, Bureaucratic corruption 
and the rate of temptation: Do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how much?, JOURNAL OF 
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, 65(2), 307, 307 (2001). 
14  Timothy Besley & John McLaren, Taxes and bribery: The role of wage incentives, THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 
103(416), 119, 137 (1993); Dilip Mookherjee, Incentive reforms in developing country bureaucracies: Lessons from 
tax administration, in: Annual World Bank Conference On Development Economics, 103 (Boris Pleskovic & 
Joseph. E. Stiglitz eds., 1997). 
15  Olivier Armantier & Amadou Boly, On the effects of incentive framing on bribery: Evidence from an experi-
ment in Burkina Faso, ECONOMICS OF GOVERNANCE, 15(1), 1, 13 (2014). 
16  Robert M. Bowen, Andrew C. Call & Shiva Rajgopal, Whistle-blowing: Target firm characteristics and eco-
nomic consequences, THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 85(4), 1239–1271 (2010); Kevin Buckler, The quantita-
tive/qualitative divide revisited: A study of published research, doctoral program curricula, and journal editor 
perceptions, JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE EDUCATION, 19(3), 383–403 (2008); JOHN W. CRESWELL,  RE-
SEARCH DESIGN: QUALITATIVE, QUANTITATIVE, AND MIXED METHOD APPROACHES 183 (4th ed., 2013). 
17  PHILIPP MAYRING, QUALITATIVE INHALTSANALYSE: GRUNDLAGEN UND TECHNIKEN, 10f (11th ed., 2010). 	
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order to understand the perspective of those committing bribery. Subsequently, 20 pre-
vention and law enforcement experts were interviewed. Eight interviewees were recruited 
from big four consulting firms prominent in the field of anti-bribery compliance in mul-
tinational corporations. This allowed particular focus on fraud investigation and dispute 
services. Eight compliance officers of multinational corporations, responsible for design-
ing and implementing anti-bribery policies, were also interviewed. Finally, four law en-
forcement experts were interviewed. In analyzing the interviews, a category system was 
formed and assessed on its objectivity, reliability, and validity through triangulation. 18 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
According to the partners of the big four consulting firms, both productivity and com-
pliance should be remunerated, since employees are expected to be productive and act 
compliantly. By only paying them for productivity, employees may seek non-compliant 
ways of increasing their output. In this context, current incentive systems may even en-
courage employees to break compliance rules.  
 
However, the compliance officers in multinational corporations contended that reward-
ing both productivity and compliance can be rather challenging, given the difficulty of 
determining whether an employee has acted compliantly or not. Therefore, it is im-
portant to use performance matrixes that include several types of output.  
 
The partners of the big four consulting firms also suggested introducing a bonus and ma-
lus system, as well as a bonus bank. Employees could then be rewarded for productivity 
and compliance, with small compliance violations (those that are not grounds for termi-
nating employment) resulting in a malus deduction from their bonus bank. This could 
help to partially overcome the lack of transparency commonly associated with bribery, 
since acts of non-compliance may be discovered several years after their commission. Bo-
nus banks could, thus, help to ensure that employees paying bribes are not rewarded eco-
nomically for their actions.  
 
The white-collar criminals suggested rewarding whistleblowing as an additional control 
mechanism. The underlying reasoning is that employees (agents) can control one another 
but need an incentive to be willing to report their peers. Hence, a bonus could be paid for 
whistleblowing. 
 
Conversely, the compliance officers emphasized that bonus payments for whistleblowing 
could lead to false accusations and, hence, unnecessary investigations. In addition, such 			
18  Marilyn Healy & Chad Perry, Comprehensive criteria to judge validity and reliability of qualitative research 
within the realism paradigm, QUALITATIVE MARKET RESEARCH, 3(3), 118, 118f (2000).; Nicholas Mays & 
Catherine Pope, Assessing quality in qualitative research, BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL, 320(7226), 50, 50 
(2000); Janice M. Morse, Michael Barrett, Maria Mayan, Karin Olson & Jude Spiers, Verification strategies for 
establishing reliability and validity in qualitative research, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF QUALITATIVE 
METHODS, 1(2), 13, 13f (2002). 
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whistleblowing bonuses could have a negative impact in team-based cultures, since people 
could stop trusting one another. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Incentive systems could play an important role in eliminating bribery. In particular, em-
ployees should be rewarded for both productivity and compliance, with performance 
measured through matrixes. In addition, a combination of bonus and malus payments 
could help to reward compliant and sanction non-compliant behavior. Bonus payments 
for whistleblowing could also help to establish an additional control mechanism. In this 
context, however, it should be kept in mind that whistleblowing bonuses could lead to 
false accusations and destroy the team-based cultures central to many corporations. Fi-
nally, it should be recognized that a study with a larger sample conducted in different 
countries or at a different time could produce different results.19 
			
19  Janice M. Morse, Michael Barrett, Maria Mayan, Karin Olson & Jude Spiers, Verification strategies for estab-
lishing reliability and validity in qualitative research, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF QUALITATIVE METH-
ODS, 1(2), 13, 18 (2002); FABIAN M. TEICHMANN, ANTI-BRIBERY COMPLIANCE INCENTIVES, 10f (2017). 
